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Abstract
This paper analyzes how the interaction between green consumers and
responsible ﬁrms affects the market equilibrium. The main result is that
a higher responsibility by both producers and consumers can have differ-
ent impacts on the efﬁciency of the ﬁrms’ abatement activity, depending on
the nature of the cleaning costs. When the abatement costs are ﬁxed, the
efﬁciency of the clean-up effort is always increasing in their degree of re-
sponsibility. On the other hand, when the abatement costs are variable, a
higher level of responsibility may reduce social welfare. Finally, the ﬁrst
best allocation is never reached, even in the presence of the highest credible
level of responsibility of both consumers and producers.
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11 Introduction
In the late years a growing body of the environmental economics literature has
been devoted to the analysis of the so called third generation instruments for the
control of pollution. Indeed, the classic command and control approach can be
substituted, or integrated, not only by economic instruments (as taxes, subsidies
and tradable permits) but also by the voluntary market choices of environmentally
aware agents.1 However, the current debate is far from a complete understand-
ing of the actual capabilities of individual and ﬁrm responsibility as a means to
effectively promote environmental protection (see Bénabou and Tirole, 2010).
In many sectors ﬁrms try to increase their market share by advertising their
production as environment-friendly. As noted by Kotchen (2005) and Besley
and Ghatak (2007), environment-friendly goods can be viewed as impure public
goods, in which private and public characteristics are bundled together. As em-
phasized by Bagnoli and Watts (2003), the form of this bundling can be explicit or
implicit. The ﬁrst case corresponds to situations in which ﬁrms improve the envi-
ronmental quality of the good they provide and, consequently, they increase their
marginal costs of production. On the other hand, the second case corresponds
to situations in which ﬁrms sustain environmental programs whose beneﬁts and
costs are not proportional to their sales.
There is a large evidence that many consumers are willing to pay a price pre-
mium to purchase environment-friendly goods. The premium paid represents a
form of voluntary contribution to the provision of a public good. In the economic
literature there are different ways to reconcile this behavior with the traditional
assumption of self-interested agents. A ﬁrst attempt is based on the assumption
that green consumers obtain a direct utility by the environmental qualities of the
goods they buy. In this view green consumers derive a warm glow from their
responsible action (Andreoni, 1990), due to social approval or to their internal
moral motivation. On the other hand, we could think that green consumers be-
have as conditional cooperator, who accept to sacriﬁce their utility conditional
on expectations that others will do the same. Indeed, many authors (e.g. Ostrom,
2000) emphasized that in the presence of social dilemmas, if all the individuals
seek to maximize their egoistic interest, they are unavoidably trapped in a sub-
optimal equilibrium. For this reason truly rational agents can choose to switch
to more reﬁned choice criteria. We do not deepen this problem in our paper, but
when we carry out the welfare analysis we choose to explore only the inﬂuence
1See Khanna, 2001, for a good survey on this historical evolution.
2of responsible choices on the efﬁciency of the environmental protection activity,
disregarding their consequences in terms of consumers’ surplus. Indeed, the cal-
culation of consumers’ surplus requires a clear cut deﬁnition of consumers’ utility.
The economic literature traditionally has analyzed the green consumers phe-
nomenon in the framework of vertically differentiated markets. A ﬁrst group of
paper focused on how the presence of green consumers interacts with the optimal
environmental policy (see Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Cremer and Thisse,
1999; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Bansal and Gangopadhyay,
2003; Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005). A second group dealt with the impact of a
higher consumers’ consciousness on the market equilibrium and the associated
social welfare. Frequently the results of these models warn against a naive conﬁ-
dence in consumers’ responsibility as a solution to environmental problems. In-
deed, rarely the market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers approx-
imates the maximization of social welfare (see Eriksson, 2004; Conrad, 2005).
Moreover, some authors showed that it cannot be taken for granted that a higher
level of consumers’ responsibility is always associate to less pollution and higher
welfare2 (Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2009).
Our paper can be considered as an extension of the vertically differentiated
duopoly put forward by Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009). They assume
that consumers have a different willingness to pay (hereafter WTP) for "clean"
productsandthey studyhowanincrease intheiraggregateWTP affectsthemarket
equilibrium. As far as the production technology is concerned, they assume that
the costs and the beneﬁts of the abatement activity are increasing and convex in
the level of clean-up and independent of the level of production. This assumption
covers the case in which ﬁrms devote lump-sum expenditures to environmental
protection activities not directly associated to their production of the private good.
However there are cases in which the beneﬁts and the costs of the abatement activ-
ity are proportional to the quantity produced, as happens when ﬁrms improve the
environmental quality of their production process.3 So a ﬁrst extension consists
in repeating their analysis under a different assumption regarding the technology
associated to the provision of the public good.
Moreover, the main novelty of our paper is that we allow ﬁrms to choose their
2Similar conclusions are reached in a different framework by Calveras et al. (2007). They
consider a model in which citizens ﬁrst vote the minimum environmental standard and then buy
a good produced in perfectly competitive markets. According to their analysis, a higher level of
activism in the society may imply a higher level of pollution.
3Many existing models adopt this assumption. See for instance Cremer and Thisse (1999),
Eriksson (2004), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Conrad (2005) and Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007).
3market strategy in accordance with an objective function that may not coincide
with proﬁt maximization. Indeed, in some markets, especially when the good
traded is an impure public good, we can observe competition between ﬁrms with
different aims. For instance, standard for proﬁt ﬁrms may compete with non-
proﬁt ﬁrms, whose main objective is the maximization of the positive externality
associated to their production.4
Recently many ﬁrms spend a lot of efforts in order to persuade consumers that
their behavior is socially responsible. However, there is not a general consensus
with regard to the exact concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We re-
port two polar deﬁnitions that can appear in sharp contrast.5 According to a ﬁrst
point of view, a ﬁrm is socially responsible when it takes environment-friendly
actions not required by law. In this light, CSR can be deﬁned without any regard
neither to the motivation of the ﬁrm’s choices nor to the impact of such choices
on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. However, many authors believe that a ﬁrm is truly responsible
only when it sacriﬁces its proﬁt, at least in part, in order to carry out some social
objective. Baron (2001) names the ﬁrst behavior as strategic CSR and the second
one as altruistic CSR.
In all the existing models regarding the inﬂuence of green consumers on the
market equilibrium, ﬁrms are assumed to behave as standard proﬁt maximizers.
Consequently the current literature explores only the effect of the interaction be-
tween green consumers and ﬁrms engaged in strategic CSR. We propose a more
general approach in which ﬁrms’ objective function weighs together their proﬁt
and the social impact of their actions. In this view, ﬁrms’ degree of CSR can be
interpreted as the relative weight they assign to the second objective. Our purpose
is to study the market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers and ﬁrms
engaged in altruistic CSR. More speciﬁcally this work aims at analyzing
1. if a higher level of responsibility of both consumers and producers is always
associated to a more efﬁcient result in terms of pollution control;
2. if a full responsibility of both producers and consumers is sufﬁcient to attain
the ﬁrst best level of pollution.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
present the general model and introduce the concepts of green consumers and
4Becchetti and Huybrechts (2007) interpret in this way the Fair Trade sector.
5An interesting debate over this issue can be found in the ﬁrst volume of the Review of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Policy. In particular, see Lyon and Maxwell (2008) and Reinhardt et al.
(2008).
4responsible ﬁrms. In Section 3 we characterize the market equilibrium in the case
in which the costs and the beneﬁts of the cleaning technology are ﬁxed (i.e.: in-
dependent of the quantity produced). In Section 4 we extend the same kind of
analysis to the alternative case in which the costs and the beneﬁts of clean-up
are assumed to be proportional to the quantity produced. In both these sections
we examine how changes in consumers’ or ﬁrms’ social responsibility affect the
efﬁciency of the aggregate abatement activity in equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The general model
2.1 The technology
There is a physically homogeneous good, whose production generates pollution.
The production costs depend on both the quantity produced, x, and the level of








i ; 8i = 1;:::;n; (1)
where k is a constant and  indicates how the quantity produced affects the abate-
ment costs. Speciﬁcally,  can assume two values: zero when the abatement costs
are ﬁxed, and one when these costs are variable.
The total emissions for a single ﬁrm are:
Yi(ei) =  exi   eix

i ; 8i = 1;:::;n; (2)
 e is the unitary level of emissions without clean-up activity. We assume that when
the abatement costs are ﬁxed,  = 0, then the clean-up activity of a generic ﬁrm
i is independent of xi. In this case, according to the deﬁnition introduced by
Bagnoli and Watts (2003), the private provision of the public good "abatement" is
only implicitly linked to sales of the private good. On the other hand, when the
abatement costs are variable,  = 1, the clean-up activity of ﬁrm i is proportional
to xi. This case corresponds to a situation in which the provision of the public
good and of the private good are explicitly linked. Finally, let us deﬁne Y = Pn
i=1 Yi the aggregate emissions.
2.2 The social welfare
Polluting emissions represent an externality, affecting negatively the consumers’
utility. We normalize the consumers’ population to a unit mass and we assume
5that every unit of emission reduces the utility of a generic consumer by , which




, where F(0) = 0 and
F( ) = 1. As a consequence, the social beneﬁts of the clean-up activity is equal








We identify the social welfare W with the efﬁciency of the environmental pro-
tection. Consequently W is deﬁned as the difference between the social beneﬁts















Hence, the maximization of the social welfare entails that the ﬁrst best level





; 8i = 1;:::;n; (4)
which does not depend on the quantity produced. It is worth noting that whatever
the total abatement is, its cost effective allocation requires that ﬁrms’ marginal
costs coincide, implying that total abatement should be shared equally among
them.
We assume that the environmental regulator cannot force ﬁrms to adopt a pos-
itive level of clean-up. Consequently, if T is strictly higher than 0, then the public
good "abatement" is too scarce and responsible citizens can choose to voluntarily
contribute to its provision by producing or consuming more environment-friendly
goods.
2.3 The demand side
On the demand side, consumers are interested in buying only one unit of the good.
Mainly, a share 0    1 of consumers’ population (labeled as green) takes into
account ﬁrms’ abatement efforts in choosing which product to buy, while all the
others consumers acts as (radical) free riders. We let the WTP of green consumers
be heterogeneous among them. Formally, a generic green consumer chooses a
product to maximize:6
6We assume that each consumer takes the total emissions Y as exogenous because her individ-
ual contribution to pollution is negligible.
6H = V   p + e   Y; (5)
where V is the (homogeneous) gross utility of consuming one unit of the product
and  is the individual WTP for the marginal increase in ﬁrms’ abatement, as-




.7 Therefore the total WTP for
more environment-friendly products, T, is equal to
 






This ratio can be considered as an index of the social capital of the consumers’
populationbecauseitrepresentshowmuchtheirchoicesaredrivenbysocialrather
than individualistic motivations. We limit the aggregate consumers’ WTP to be
lower than their aggregate marginal disutility of emissions, i.e. T is weakly lower
than T. Given this assumption, it follows that 0    1.
2.4 The supply side
On the supply side, following Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009), there is
the coexistence of two kinds of ﬁrms. On the one hand, a fringe of ﬁrms who
provide the good without employing any clean-up activity. Given that they sell
an homogenous product and compete à la Bertrand, they charge a price equal to
0 (the marginal cost of production when e = 0), and they do not achieve extra
proﬁt. On the other hand, in the presence of green consumers, other ﬁrms can
choose to employ the cleaning technology in order to differentiate their product
and to obtain a strictly positive proﬁt. We assume that there are only two ﬁrms
that are able to carry out this abatement activity. We use H and L to denote the
variables associated to the ﬁrms choosing the high and the low level of abatement.
Their proﬁt is equal to:







i ; i = L;H; (7)
where xi represents ﬁrm’s i market share.
7We choose to pay attention only to the case in which the lowest WTP is 0 in order to simplify
our analysis of market equilibrium.
7These two ﬁrms are labeled as responsible because they overcomply the exist-
ing environmental regulation.8 However they can have a different willingness to
sacriﬁce their proﬁt in order to increase their clean-up. Formally, we allow them
to have the following composite objective function that weighs the maximization










i s:t: i  0; i = L;H; (8)
where i 2 [0;1]. When i = 0 we have the standard case of a proﬁt-maximizer
ﬁrm; when i = 1 we have the opposite case of a non-proﬁt ﬁrm who simply
wants to maximize the positive impact of its clean-up under the constraint of non-
negative proﬁt.9 In general, a responsible ﬁrm i pursues two different objectives
simultaneously and i is a parameter signaling the relative importance of the two
criteria. More speciﬁcally, i can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of
(altruistic) CSR of ﬁrm i.10
2.5 Firms’ competition
We model competition between the two responsible ﬁrms according to the usual
framework adopted in duopoly models of vertical differentiation. There are two
stages: in the ﬁrst one, the two ﬁrms simultaneously choose the clean-up level,
that can be deﬁned as the (environmental) quality of their product. In the second
8As sustained by Kotchen (2009), environment-friendly innovations are frequently introduced
by eco-entrepreneurs where eco-entrepreneurship can be deﬁned as "the practice of starting new
businesses in response to an identiﬁed opportunity to earn a proﬁt and provide a positive environ-
mental externality". So, the assumption regarding the existence of only two responsible producers
can be justiﬁed by noting that frequently innovation processes are driven by a limited number
of ﬁrms. Further research will be devoted to the analysis of the case in which the number of
responsible ﬁrms is endogenously determined by market competition.
9We assume that when i = 1 ﬁrm i maximizes the positive impact of its abatement activity
also if its proﬁt is equal to 0.
10As explained in De Donder and Roemer (2009), such objective can be interpreted as the
weighted Nash bargaining solution of an efﬁcient negotiation between two different factions in-
side the ﬁrm: one aiming at maximizing proﬁt and the other aiming at maximizing the positive
externality associated to ﬁrm’s production. Such interpretation is correct if i) the no agreement
pay-offs are (0;0), as happens when a ﬁrm is part of the competitive fringe, that does not obtain
any extra-proﬁt and does not produce any positive externality, ii) the objective function of each
faction is log-concave in ﬁrm’s strategic choices of p and e (for our case this property is proved
in the technical appendix). According to such interpretation, i represents the relative negotiation
power of the faction supporting the abatement activity inside the ﬁrm i.
8stage the two ﬁrms observe the choice of their competitor and simultaneously
set the price. We know that when the lowest consumers’ WTP is equal to 0, in
equilibrium arises an uncovered market conﬁguration (see Motta, 1993). This
means that in equilibrium a group of green consumers buys a standard good from
the competitive fringe.
The market share of each ﬁrm can be calculated by identifying ^ , the indiffer-
ent consumer between purchasing from either the high or the low quality ﬁrm, and
~ , the indifferent consumer between buying either the low or the null quality prod-
uct. Straightforward algebra, using equation (5), it is easy to see that: ^  =
pH pL
eH eL
and ~  =
pL
eL. As known, in a vertically differentiated duopoly, the high (low) qual-
ity ﬁrm sells to green consumers included in
h
^ ;  
i h
~ ; ^ 
i




















;x0 = 1   xH   xL; (9)
where x0 is the total quantity sold by ﬁrms of the competitive fringe.
We apply the standard backward induction methodology by ﬁrst analyzing the
priceequilibriumand thentheenvironmentalqualityequilibrium. Inthefollowing
sections we analyze separately the cases of ﬁxed and variable costs.
3 Fixed Costs of Clean-up
3.1 The Market Equilibrium















s:t: i  0; i = L;H: (10)
It is worth noting that in case of ﬁxed costs the generalization of the ﬁrms’
objective function has no consequence on the price-setting stage. Indeed, at the
second stage the abatement activity is considered as exogenous, and so the respon-
sible ﬁrms choose their price strategy in order to maximize only their revenues,
whatever their degree of CSR is. So the price equilibrium can be found by solving
9simultaneously the revenue maximization of both ﬁrms. As shown in the existing
literature (Motta, 1993; Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995), at this stage the unique
Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
p
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L =  eHeL
(eH   eL)






In order to identify the duopolists’ maximization problem at the ﬁrst stage,
equations (11) and (12) are substituted in equation (10). The equilibrium levels




































The ﬁrst order conditions require:
@JH
@eH
= 0 ,  
4e3
H   (3 + 2H)e2
HeL + (2   H)eHe2
L




11As explained by Motta (1993), the solutions of this system are only the candidate equilibrium
of the model. In the technical appendix we show that second order conditions hold, and conse-
quently every solution represents effectively a local maximum. Moreover, we have checked that
the ﬁrm choosing the high (low) quality has no incentive to "leapfrog" the rival ﬁrm and itself
produce the lowest (highest) quality.
12We neglect the constrain that the ﬁrms’ proﬁt must be positive as we will verify that such
condition is always satisﬁed in equilibrium.
13We use H and L to indicate the degree of CSR of the ﬁrms producing the high and the low
level of clean-up. However, it is important to emphasize that we do not restrict the relative size of
their degree of CSR.
10@JL
@eL
= 0 ,  
4e3
H   (7   2L)e2
HeL + LeHe2
L




In order to study whether ﬁrms’ abatement activities are strategically substi-






H + (10   12H)eHeL + (2   H)e2
L





H + (14   12L)eHeL   Le2
L
(4eH   eL)4 : (16)
Straightforward, the cross derivatives of each ﬁrm’s objective function is de-
creasing in its own degree of CSR. However, the cross derivative of ﬁrm L (eq.
16) is always positive (given that L  1): in equilibrium the optimal abatement
for the low quality ﬁrm is always increasing in the abatement chosen by its rival.
Conversely, the cross derivatives of ﬁrm H (eq. 15) is strictly positive for H = 0,
while is strictly negative when H = 1. Hence, the best response of the high qual-
ity ﬁrm can be both increasing and decreasing in the abatement level chosen by
its rival, depending on its degree of CSR (and on the equilibrium levels of ﬁrms’
abatement).
Following the deﬁnition of Bulow et al. (1985), if H is quite low, then eH
and eL are strategic complements, while for higher values of H, we have neither
strategiccomplementaritynorstrategicsubstitutabilityatthesecondstagebecause
the slopes of the two reaction functions have different sign.
The solutions of the system given by equations (13) and (14) can be found
making the ratio between them. We obtain:14
4(2   H)
3   (46   20L   7H + 2LH)
2+
+ (24   10L + 16H   9LH)   4(2   L)(2   H) = 0;
where  is equal to
eH
eL.  can be interpreted as the degree of (environmental)
differentiation. This equation has a unique acceptable solution  = g(H;L).
14This equation is a generalization of equation (7) of Motta (1993, p. 117) to the case in which
ﬁrms aim at maximizing not only their proﬁt but also the positive externality implicitly associated
to their production.
11In Figure 1 we show the three dimensional plot of . It is monotonically in-
creasing (decreasing) in H (L), 8H;L 2 [0;1]: hence, the higher the degree
of CSR of the ﬁrm H (L) the higher (lower) the environmental differentiation.
It’s worth noting that  has a maximum in g(1;0) = 8;6164 and a minimum in
g(0;1) = 2;7452.
Figure 1:  = g(H;L)
Substituting eH with eL in (14) we achieve the equilibrium level of clean-up
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L) + L]






()2[4()2   (7   2L) + L]
(4   1)3 :




4[4()2   (7   2L) + L]





4()2[4()2   (7   2L) + L]
(2   L)(4   1)3 e
FB: (18)
Trivially, if all consumers are radical free riders (i.e.:  = 0), ﬁrms will not
employ a cleaning technology, whatever their objective function is. It’s worth
12noting that in this model in order to have an abatement activity in equilibrium the
presence of green consumers is both necessary and sufﬁcient. On the other hand,
the mere existence of responsible ﬁrms is not sufﬁcient.




Proof. In Figure 2 we report the ratio15 eH over eFB calculated by means of equa-
tion (18). It can be easily seen that it is always positive but less than 1. Moreover,
given that  is always strictly higher than 1, e
L is always less than e
H for  > 0.
Figure 2: e
H=eFB
This lemma allows us to conclude that, even if consumers and producers were
fully responsible, the market equilibrium will not correspond to the ﬁrst best al-
location: both the responsible ﬁrms never adopt an efﬁcient level of clean-up.
Moreover the allocation of the aggregate abatement is not cost-effective because
in equilibrium the two responsible ﬁrms never adopt the same level of clean-up
and so their marginal costs differ.
In order to analyze how the degree of responsibility of consumers and pro-
ducers affects the overall efﬁciency of the abatement activity we can now conduct
15Figure 2 is plotted under the assumption that  = 1, so it indicates the maximum values that
the ratio eH over eFB can assume.
13some comparative statics. Note that given equations (17) and (18) there is a pos-
itive relationship between the social capital index and the equilibrium level of
clean-up of both the responsible ﬁrms. The following lemma states how the de-
gree of ﬁrms’ social responsibility inﬂuences their equilibrium level of clean-up:
Lemma 2. In the presence of green consumers (i.e.: if  > 0):
1. e
L is monotonically increasing in L and H, 8H;L 2 [0;1];
2. e
H is monotonically increasing in H, while it is monotonically increasing
(decreasing) in L if H is close to 0 (1). For intermediate values of H,
eH is not monotone in L;
3. ET = e
H+e
L is monotonically increasing in L and H, 8H;L 2 [0;1].
Proof. The inﬂuence of the degree of CSR of both the responsible ﬁrms on their
equilibrium levels of abatement are proved by means of the contour plots shown
in Figure 3. The left-hand side shows that e
L has iso-curves negatively sloped and
that it reaches its maximum value in the point (H = 1;L = 1). This means
that e
L is monotone increasing in both H and L. On the other hand, the central
contour plot shows that the iso-curve of e
H are decreasing in correspondence of
low values of H and increasing for high values of H. Moreover, e
H reaches
its maximum value in correspondence of the point H = 1;L = 0. This prove
that a higher H always implies a higher e
H, while the inﬂuence of L on e
H
depends on the value of H. Finally, the right-hand side shows that the sum of
ﬁrms’ abatement activities in equilibrium is monotone increasing in both H and
L. Indeed, the iso-curves are negatively sloped and the maximum is reached in
the point (H = 1;L = 1).
Therefore increments in the degree of responsibility of a ﬁrm always entails an
increase of its own abatement activity. On the other hand increments in the degree
of responsibility of the rival ﬁrm may not have a clear-cut effect for both ﬁrms.
Indeed, it is always true that the higher H, the higher e
L, while an increment of
L may both increase and decrease e
H, depending on the level of H. This result
is due to the different sign that the cross derivative of JH can assume. As seen
above, when ﬁrm H carries out a sufﬁciently high (low) degree of CSR, then its
best response is decreasing (increasing) in the level of clean-up of ﬁrm L. As a
consequence, given that an increment of L increases e
L, we have that when H
is sufﬁciently high (low) e
H is decreasing (increasing) in L. However, the total
level of abatement is monotonically increasing in the degree of CSR of each ﬁrm.
14Figure 3: Contour Plot of e
L and e
H
Note: the lighter colors are associated with higher values.
3.2 The Social Welfare
In the case of ﬁxed costs of clean-up, the social welfare deﬁned in equation (3)














Proposition 1. The social welfare is monotonically increasing in , L and H,
8 , H, L 2 [0;1].















Given Lemma 1, e
i < eFB , T   ke
i > 0. Therefore, the sign of the
derivatives of the social welfare with respect to an exogenous parameter will de-




@z has the same sign, 8i = L;H, then also @W
@z will have that sign.
Therefore, given equations (17) and (18) and Lemma 2, the social welfare is ev-



















Applying Lemma 2 to formula 21 we can conclude that the social welfare is
monotone increasing also in L. The following contour plot (Figure 4) conﬁrms
that the social welfare has its global maximum in (H = 1, L = 1).
Figure 4: Contour Plot of W(H;L)
This result is in line with Garcia Gallego and Georgantzis (2009), who had
already shown that, in the uncovered market conﬁguration, the social welfare is
increasing in consumers’ WTP. However, in this paper we show that the social
welfare is also increasing in the degree of CSR of both the responsible ﬁrms.
Corollary 1. The highest social welfare is attained when  = 1, L = 1 and
H = 1, but it does not correspond to the ﬁrst best solution.
Proof. Proposition 1 ensures that the maximum welfare associated to the market
equilibrium is reached when both , L and H have their maximum value. In
such case, the social welfare calculated by means of equation (19) is equal to
0;4366
(T)2
k . However, if the level of abatement of both the responsible ﬁrms
was
T




of its ﬁrst best level.
Therefore, the market equilibrium never achieves the ﬁrst best solution, even
if both consumers and producers behave as fully responsible agents. The inef-
ﬁciency of the market equilibrium is due to two different reasons: ﬁrstly, the
clean-up of both the responsible ﬁrms is always lower than the ﬁrst best level and
consequently total abatement is below its optimal level. Moreover, the allocation
of total abatement is not cost effective because it is not equally shared between the
two responsible ﬁrms, whatever their degree of altruistic CSR (both these facts are
emphasized in Lemma 1).
To sum up, when the clean-up activity of the responsible ﬁrms is only implic-
itly linked to their production, the efﬁcient level of the abatement is never reached
in equilibrium (Corollary 1). However, an increase of both ﬁrms’ CSR and con-
sumers’ WTP have always a positive effect on the social welfare (Proposition 1).
In the next section we shall show that even this result is not guaranteed when the
clean-up activity is explicitly associated to the production level (i.e. when both
beneﬁts and costs of the cleaning technology are variable).
Proposition2. AssumethatH = 0
L > L = 0




Proof. Let us analyze the contour plot of the Welfare (Figure 4). It is straightfor-
ward that if we consider both a point such that H > L and its symmetric point
with respect to the 45 line, the former is always associated to a higher social
welfare than the latter.
The existing literature regarding vertically differentiated duopolies has already
stressed the existence of two symmetric Nash equilibria at the quality stage. How-
ever, in the present model these two equilibria are asymmetric (if H 6= L) given
the asymmetry in the ﬁrms’ objective functions. Proposition 2 states that the so-
cial welfare is always higher in the equilibrium in which the high quality ﬁrms is
at the same time the ﬁrm with the highest degree of CSR.
Thanks to Propositions 1 and 2 we can compare a standard duopoly, where
the ﬁrms are both proﬁt maximizers, with a mixed duopoly, where a non-proﬁt
producer competes with a proﬁt maximizer ﬁrm. When the costs of the abatement
activity are only implicitly linked to the production level, then the presence of a
non-proﬁt ﬁrm is always welfare improving, and from the social welfare stand-
point it is preferable the equilibrium in which the non-proﬁt ﬁrm carries out the
highest level of clean-up.
174 Variable Costs of Clean-up
4.1 The Market Equilibrium



















xi; i = L;H; (23)
and the market shares of each ﬁrm are still given by (9). In this case the prices af-
fect not only ﬁrms’ proﬁt but also the size of their positive externality. Therefore,
equilibrium prices are now dependent on the degree of CSR of both ﬁrms.
By computing the ﬁrst derivatives of JH and JL with respect to prices and then







H + (1   H)ke2
L + 2 (1   H)(2   L)(eH   eL)







H + (2   H)keLeH + 2 (1   H)(1   L)(eH   eL)]
2[(2   H)(2   L)eH   (1   H)(1   L)eL]
;
yielding proﬁts:



















(2   L)(2    keH)   keL)






(1   H)(2    keL) + keH)

2 [(2   H)(2   L)eH   (1   H)(1   L)eL]
: (27)
18We can now include equations (24) and (25) in the generic equation (22) and










xH = 0; (28)
@JL
@eL






eH   2eL + LeL
eH
xL = 0: (29)
Moorthy (1988) has already shown that when vertically differentiated ﬁrms
behave as proﬁt maximizers, their reaction functions are both positively sloped
and so their quality choices are strategic complements. However, it is easy to
check that if the high quality ﬁrm is a non-proﬁt ﬁrm, i.e. when H = 1, its
best response function is negatively sloped16 while the best response function of
ﬁrm L is still positively sloped. Therefore we may not record neither strategic
complementarity nor strategic substitutability, as in the ﬁxed costs case.
The system given by equations (28) and (29) can have at maximum one ac-
ceptable solution (i.e.: such that e
H  e
L). When one solution exists, such so-
lution corresponds to the equilibrium levels of marginal clean-up of both ﬁrms17,
which depend on the parameters H and L. The solutions in the closed form
are not analytically feasible. However, some clear results emerges when one of
the duopolists is a non-proﬁt ﬁrm and it produces either the high-quality or the
low-quality good.
Proposition 3. If L = 1, then at the ﬁrst stage no Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. In this case the market shares of the responsible ﬁrms can be rewritten by
substituting L = 1 in formula (26) and (27). We obtain:
xH =
(2    keL   keH)
2 (2   H)
; (30)




17In the technical appendix it is shown that in correspondence of the unique acceptable solution
second order conditions hold also in the case of variable costs. However, not all the candidate
solutions are valid because, as reported in the technical appendix, in some cases some ﬁrm has an
incentive to leapfrog the "equilibrium" level of marginal abatement of its rival.
19xL =
[(1   H)(2    keL) + keH]
2 (2   H)
: (31)






+ xL = 2(1   H)(    keL) + keH (32)
From equation ((30)) we can deduce that xH  0 , keL   . This fact
implies that equation ((32)) is always strictly positive. Consequently, at the ﬁrst
stage the ﬁrm L wants to choose eL = eH, the maximum level of marginal abate-
ment under the constraint that eL must be weakly lower than eH. On the other
hand, if H < 1, the ﬁrm H always want to choose eH > eL, because if eH = eL
its proﬁt is equal to 0. Hence, when L = 1 no Nash equilibrium exists at the ﬁrst
stage.
Therefore, when one of the two responsible producers is a non-proﬁt ﬁrm,
there is no equilibrium in which it chooses the low level of marginal abatement.
Indeed, in such case the ﬁrm L would mimic the choice of its competitor, while
the ﬁrm H would choose a level of marginal abatement strictly higher than the
level of its rival.
As a consequence, in the presence of a non-proﬁt ﬁrm, the only Nash equilib-
rium can be characterized by substituting H = 1 in equations ((28)) and ((29)).
Lemma 3. If  > 0,   > 0, and H = 1, then in equilibrium:
1. e
L is monotonically increasing in   and L, decreasing in k and indepen-
dent of ;
2. x
L is monotonically increasing in  and L and independent of   and k;
3. e
H is monotonically increasing in  , decreasing in k and L and indepen-
dent of ;
4. x
H is monotonically increasing in , decreasing in L and independent of
  and k;




L is monotonically increasing in  and   and decreasing
in k and L.
20Proof. Note that if  > 0,   > 0, H = 1 and L 2 [0;1) then the solution of the



















Substituting these solutions in equations (27) and (26) the following equilib-












9   8L + 22
L
(36)





H and ET in the way stated in the proposition. As far as the impact of the the




































Therefore, in the presence of a non-proﬁt ﬁrm, the only Nash equilibrium is
characterized by the fact that the other ﬁrm always adopts the lowest level of
quality (i.e.: marginal abatement). Moreover, if this low quality ﬁrm assigns a
higher weight to its CSR then its positive externality increases. However, this
effect is counterbalanced by the reduction of the positive externality of the high
quality ﬁrm. This result is coherent with the slope of the best response function
of ﬁrm H. If ﬁrm L becomes more careful with the environmental impact of
its production, it will increase its level of abatement, but at the same time, it will
reduce its mark-up, increasing its supply. On the other hand, ﬁrm H cannot reduce
its price without reducing its level of clean-up because it always charges a price
equal to its marginal costs. Hence, ﬁrm H ﬁnds it convenient to decrease its level
of abatement in order to limit the reduction of its market share. The last statement
shows us that the aggregate effect of an increase in L entails a reduction of the
total abatement.
21Figure 5: Nash equilibrium existence
More general results regarding the market equilibrium in the presence of two
responsible ﬁrms can be obtained through numerical calculations. Figure 5 gen-
eralizes Proposition 3 identifying in the shaded region the set of couples (H;L)
in which a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) fails to exist. Indeed, in such
cases, ﬁrm H would have an incentive to leapfrog18 ﬁrm L by choosing a level of
abatement lower than e
L(H;L) in order to increase its market share and its total
abatement. Consequently, at the ﬁrst stage we can have zero, one or two Nash
equilibria, depending on the weight that both the responsible ﬁrms assign to their
proﬁt. Making the symmetry of the shaded region with respect to the bisectrix
we can identify three different regions: when the shaded region and its symmetric
region coincide no Nash equilibrium exists. For all the other couples of values of
(i;j) contained in the shaded region only a Nash equilibrium exists, in which
H > L. Finally, for the couples of (i;j) which are contained nor in the
shaded region nor in its symmetric counterpart, two Nash equilibria exist.
Hence, if both the ﬁrms assign a high weight to the positive externality as-
sociated to their own production, the outcome of their strategic interaction is un-
predictable. However, when a Nash equilibrium exists, we can analyze through
numerical calculations how the market equilibrium is affected by consumers’ and





k and independent of , while both x
L and x
H are linearly
increasing in  and independent of   and k. As far as the impact of ﬁrms’ degree
18The numerical calculations are available upon request.
22of responsibility on market equilibrium we resume the main observations in the
following lemma:
Lemma 4. When a Nash equilibrium exists, the following properties hold:
1. e
L is monotonically increasing in L, while it is increasing (decreasing) in
H only when L is sufﬁciently low (high). For intermediate values of L,
e
L is (almost) constant. x
L is monotone increasing in L and monotone de-
creasing in H. Finally, e
Lx
L is monotone increasing in L and monotone
decreasing in H.
2. e
H is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in H only when L is sufﬁ-
ciently low (high). For intermediate values of L, e
H is at ﬁrst increasing
and then decreasing. At the same time, e
H is monotonically increasing (de-
creasing) in L only when H is sufﬁciently low (high). For intermediate
values of H, e
H is at ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing. x
H is mono-
tone increasing in H and monotone decreasing in L. Finally, e
Hx
H is
monotone increasing in H and monotone decreasing in L.




L is monotone increasing (decreasing) in H if L is
sufﬁciently low (high) and monotone increasing (decreasing) in L if H is
sufﬁciently low (high).
4.  = e
H=e
L is always monotone decreasing in L while it is monotone
decreasing in H only if L is sufﬁciently high. When L is low,  is ﬁrst
increasing and then decreasing in H.
Proof. See the 3D plots in Figure 6.
Hence, we can observe that the equilibrium levels of per unit abatement are
affected in different ways by ﬁrms’ degree of responsibility. At the same time,
ﬁrms’ market shares and their total abatement are always increasing in their own
degree of CSR, and decreasing in the degree of responsibility of the rival ﬁrm.
The overall impact on the aggregate level of clean-up can be various. Indeed, an
increase in the degree of responsibility of one ﬁrm can either increase or decrease
the aggregate clean-up depending on the degree of responsibility of the other ﬁrm.
Finally, an increase in the degree of responsibility of ﬁrm L makes the allocation
of the abatement activity more cost effective (i.e. it decreases the value of ),
while an increase in the degree of responsibility of ﬁrm H has not always the
same effect on .
23Lemma 5. When an equilibrium exists, e
H S eFB and e
L S eFB, depending on
the speciﬁc values of  ;L;H. At the same time, T   k
2e
i > 0, 8i = L;H,
8 ;L;H.
Proof. See the graph of e
H and e
L in Figure 6. When ,   and k are put equal
to 1, there are couples (H;L) for which e
H and/or e
L are higher than 0:5. As
a consequence, given the linear proportionality to  , when maximum consumers’
WTP is close to its maximum value (i.e. 2T) both the responsible ﬁrms may exert
a level of abatement higher than the ﬁrst best level (i.e.
T
k ). At the same time, the
graph of e
H and e
L in Figure 6 show that both the equilibrium levels of clean-up
never assume a value higher than
 
k. Hence, the inequality contained in the lemma
follows.
Therefore, contrarily to what happens in the ﬁxed costs case, when the costs
are variable in equilibrium both ﬁrms may choose to exert a level of abatement
inefﬁciently high (i.e. higher than the ﬁrst best level). Hence, the statements of
Lemma 4 and 5 do not allow any clear deduction with regard to the inﬂuence on
the social welfare of a higher degree of responsibility by part of consumers or
of a single ﬁrm. Indeed, a higher degree of responsibility in the population of
green consumers always increases the aggregate abatement, but it may induce the
responsible ﬁrms to adoptan inefﬁciently high level of marginal abatement. At the
same time, an increase in the degree of CSR of one ﬁrm has not a clear-cut effect
on the aggregate abatement and on the cost-effectiveness of the allocation of such
activity. We then devote next paragraph to the analysis of how the responsibility
of consumers and ﬁrms affect the social welfare.
4.2 The Social Welfare
In the case of variable costs of clean-up, the social welfare deﬁned in equation (3)



















Proposition 4. The social welfare function is monotone increasing in  and con-
cave in   (i.e.: @2W
@ 2 < 0). Its partial (ﬁrst) derivative with respect to   is never
monotone.
































@ is surely positive given that
@e
i
@ = 0, (T   k
2e








@  = 0 and
@2e
i
@ 2 = 0 we obtain that:
@2W











Hence, W is concave in  . Furthermore, as
@e
i
@  > 0 and
@x
i
@  = 0, we can note
that the sign of @W
@  depends on the sign of (T   ke
i), 8i = L;H. Consequently,
when   is close to 0 (2T) both e
H and e
L are lower (higher) than eFB and W is
increasing (decreasing) in  . Therefore, W is never monotone in  .
As far as the pattern of W with respect to L and H, it is impossible to derive
analytical results. However, using numerical simulations, in Figure 7 we show
that W can be both increasing and decreasing in ﬁrms’ degree of responsibility,
depending on the speciﬁc values of L, H and  .
Therefore, in the variable costs case, the impact of H and L on the social
welfare depends crucially on their values and on the value of  . In some cases a
higher degree of responsibility of one ﬁrm can harm the social welfare. For in-
stance, the social welfare turn out to be monotonically decreasing in L when H
is very high and   is very low. At the same time, the social welfare is monotoni-
cally decreasing in H when L is very low and   is very high.
Three relevant results regarding the link between ﬁrms’ degree of responsibil-
ity and the social welfare attained in equilibrium are emphasized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 5. The highest social welfare is attained when  = 1,   ' 1;463T,
H = 1 and L ' 0;85, and it does not correspond to the ﬁrst best solution.
Proof. The maximum of W can be obtained through numerical calculations. In
correspondence of such values W = 0:33783
(T)2
k . If all the existing ﬁrms could
adopt a level of abatement equal to the ﬁrst best level the social welfare would
25be equal to 0:5
(T)2
k . Therefore, when the abatement cost are explicitly linked to
sales, the maximum social welfare achievable in equilibrium is only the 0;67% of
its ﬁrst best level.
Proposition 6. If   is very high then social welfare is higher in a standard duopoly
than in a mixed duopoly.
Proof. Thanks to Figure 5 we know that in the presence of a non-proﬁt ﬁrm and of
a proﬁt-maximizing only a Nash equilibrium exists, in which the former chooses
the high level of abatement and the latter the low level. Observing the third graph
in Figure 7 we can note that when   is very high, W(0;0) > W(1;0). Therefore
social welfare is higher in a standard duopoly (i.e. in the presence of two proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms) than in a mixed duopoly (i.e. in the presence a non-proﬁt ﬁrm
and a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm)
Proposition 7. Assume that H = 0
L > L = 0




Proof. Observing the third graph in Figure 7 we can note that when   is very
high, the social welfare in W(0;0) is decreasing in H and increasing in L. As a
consequence, W(y;0) < W(0;y) for any y strictly positive and close to 0.
Hence, when the abatement costs are proportional to ﬁrms’ sales the conclu-
sions are quite more confusing than in the ﬁxed costs case. First of all, a higher de-
gree of responsibility of consumers’ and/or ﬁrms may decrease the social welfare.
Moreover, the presence of a no-proﬁt ﬁrm competing with a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm may harm social welfare. Consequently is not always reasonable for con-
sumers and share-holders to sacriﬁce their private utility in order to voluntarily
contribute to the environmental protection. Finally, when two Nash equilibria
exists, there are cases in which the social welfare is higher when the more respon-
sible ﬁrm produces the low (environmental) quality good. Therefore in such cases
the ﬁrm with some degree of altruism should choose a level of abatement lower
than its proﬁt-maximizing rival.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate how the market equilibrium is affected by the presence
of green consumers and responsible ﬁrms. We have introduced a model where
some consumers care about the environmental impact of goods they buy and some
26ﬁrms, following a multidimensional objective, weigh together the maximization
of both their proﬁt and their abatement activity. Our analysis has focused mainly
on the effects associated to exogenous minor changes in aggregate consumers’
willingness to pay for cleaner goods orin the degree of ﬁrms’ social responsibility.
In accordance with the existing literature, we have found that the presence of
green consumers is sufﬁcient to induce some ﬁrms to overcomply the minimum
environmental standard. However we have also shown that green consumers are
also necessary. Indeed, even if ﬁrms want to maximize their abatement effort,
they would be forced to employ the standard technology if in the market nobody
is willing to pay an extra-premium for their environment friendly products.
A second result is that in our model the nature of the abatement cost function
inﬂuences how a higher level of responsibility of both producers and consumers
affects the efﬁciency of aggregate clean-up. If the costs of the cleaning process
are ﬁxed, then social welfare is monotone increasing in consumers’ WTP and in
ﬁrms’ CSR. On the other hand, if the abatement costs are variable, social welfare
may be reduced by an increase of consumers’ WTP and by a higher degree of
ﬁrms’ CSR. Therefore we cannot take for granted that a higher responsibility is
associated to a higher welfare. Moreover, if the abatement costs are ﬁxed social
welfare is always higher in a mixed than in a standard duopoly. Conversely, when
the costs are variable, social welfare may be reduced by the presence of a non-
proﬁt ﬁrm.
Finally, we have found that in both cases, a full responsibility of consumers
and producers is sufﬁcient neither to implement the ﬁrst best level of aggre-
gate clean-up, nor to achieve a cost effective allocation of the abatement activ-
ity. Hence, the existence of individuals who take care of the environment in their
market decisions is usually a good news, but it cannot be considered a perfect
substitute for environmental regulation.
Future research should extend our analysis in order to check the robustness
of our results under different assumptions. For instance, ﬁrms could compete in
a different market form: we could assume that one ﬁrm is a Stackelberg leader,
and/or that the number of responsible ﬁrms is endogenous. Moreover, responsible
ﬁrms could maximize other kind of objective functions. Finally, ﬁrms’ degree of
CSR could be endogenous: in such case we should analyze the dynamic properties
of the interaction between green consumers and responsible ﬁrms.
276 Technical Appendix
In this appendix we want to prove that at each stage the pair of candidate equi-
librium prices or qualities (i.e. the solutions of the system given by the ﬁrst or-
der conditions stemming from ﬁrms’ maximization problems) represents a Nash
equilibrium. For this purpose we need to show that i) second order conditions are
satisﬁed, and that ii) the low (high) quality ﬁrm has no incentive to leapfrog its
rival by choosing a level of abatement higher than e
H (lower than e
L).
We start by introducing the following lemma: let Ji be an objective function
givenbytheweightedproductoftwodifferentfunctions: Ji = [i(zi)]1 i[Ei(zi)]i
Lemma 6. If both i and Ei are log-concave in zi, then the solution of the ﬁrst
order condition, z
i, represents a local maximum.
Proof. We recall that the solution of a maximization problem is invariant wrt












(1   i)log[i(zi)] + i log[Ei(zi)]
Hence, if both i and Ei are log-concave in zi, then the second order condition of
the maximization problem holds.
Proposition 8. At each stage the solutions of ﬁrst order conditions represent al-
ways local maxima.
Proof. Inordertoguaranteethatthesolutionofeachﬁrstorderconditionisindeed
a local maximum we need to prove that second order conditions always hold.
Thanks to Lemma 6 we have to show that at each stage the proﬁt and the positive
externality are log-concave in each ﬁrm’s strategic choice.
Asfarastheﬁxedcostscaseisconcerned, weknowfromtheexistingliterature
(see for instance Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995) that each ﬁrm’s proﬁt function
is concave in ﬁrm’s price strategy at the second stage (whatever the quality equi-
librium) and in each ﬁrm’s quality choice at the ﬁrst stage. However, concavity of
the proﬁt functions imply also their log-concavity. At the same time, the positive
externality of each ﬁrm is equal to ei which is obviously log-concave in itself.
With regard to the variable costs case, the log-concavity of ﬁrms’ objective
function is shown below.































































 Quality stage - Recalling formulas (24) and (25) we can write:
logH = log(1   H)(eH   eL) + 2logxH;
logL = log(1   L)(eH   eL) + logeL   logeH + 2logxL;
where, thanks to formulas (26) and (27) we can know that:
logxH = logeH + log[(2   L)(2    keH)   keL] 
  log2 [(2   H)(2   L)eH   (1   H)(1   L)eL];
logxL = logeH + log[(1   H)(2    keL) + keH] 
  log2 [(2   H)(2   L)eH   (1   H)(1   L)eL];











[(2   L)(2    keH)   keL]2 
  2
[(2   H)(2   L)]2











[(1   H)(2    keL) + keH]2 
  2
[(2   H)(2   L)]2









[(2   L)(2    keH)   keL]2 
  2
[(2   H)(2   L)]2









[(1   H)(2    keL) + keH]2 
  2
[(2   H)(2   L)]2
[(2   H)(2   L)eH   (1   H)(1   L)eL]2 < 0:
Finally, in order to guarantee that (e
L;e
H) is indeed a Nash equilibrium we
have to check that the ﬁrm choosing e
L has no incentive to "leapfrog" its rival by
choosing a quality higher than e
H. Likewise, we have to verify that ﬁrm choosing
the highest quality, e
H, has no incentive to deviate by producing a quality lower
than e









H) 8H;L 2 [0;1]; (38)
where e
1 in the ﬁxed costs case is the solution of equation (13) (for the variable










L); 8H;L 2 [0;1]; (39)
where e
2 in the ﬁxed costs case is the solution of equation 14 (for the variable
costs case we have to consider equation (29)) when eH = e
L
From the numerical calculations we can observe that in the ﬁxed costs case no
ﬁrm has an incentive to leapfrog its rival in equilibrium. However, in the variable
costs case, ﬁrm H has an incentive to leapfrog ﬁrm L when L is sufﬁciently high
and H is sufﬁciently low (see Figure 5). The ﬁle with the numerical calculations
is available upon request.
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33Figure 6: Illustration of Lemma 4
Figures are drawn assuming   = 1, k = 1 and  = 1.
34Figure 7: W(H;L)
Social welfare pattern when   = 0:2;1;1:8.
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